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bstract
We propose a methodology for the assessment of potential demand and optimal supply for microcredit. We show that the total demand is a
ombination of the demand that stems from the active poor plus the demand generated by a motivator agent among the entrepreneurial non-motivated
oor. We use French data to provide an illustration of the assessment of potential demand for microcredit. We also show that the proportion of the
otential demand satisfied by a microfinance institution depends on its objective i.e. either it is socially oriented or a profit maximizer.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
As poverty alleviation tool (e.g. Hossain, 1988; Pitt, 1999;
orduch, 1999; Khandker, 2005; Ayayi, 2012); microcredit is
pplicable only to a certain type of poor people: those with at
east a minimum level of entrepreneurial skills that could use
he borrowed money to develop sustainable micro-businesses.
n effect, because micro-loans must be repaid, they should be
ffered to those who can engage in income-generating activities.
owever, in light of the growing popularity of microfinance as a
overty alleviation tool and commercial interest in microfinance
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he Eastern Finance Association, University of Stenllenbosch Business School,
ape Town, South Africa, the African Economic Research Consortium and at
he Université du Québec à Trois Rivières for their insightful comments. We are
esponsible for any errors or omissions.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.y private investors, current assessments of the potential demand
f the market by some institutions seem to be overly optimistic.
Many international organizations, as well as private con-
ulting firms such as McKinzey & Company and Standard &
oor’s, project huge growth potential for the microfinance indus-
ry (Tilman, 2006; Chavee et al., 2007). For example, Standard
Poor’s Microfinance Rating Methodology Working Group
2007) contends that, while the total number of microcredit bor-
owers today is about 100 million; of 3 billion poor around the
lobe, about half are potentially eligible for microcredit. Sim-
ly put, demand greatly surpasses supply. Because microcredit
s primarily aimed at to launch microenterprise, and assum-
ng that Standard and Poor’s claim hold, one can infer that
n average, every other poor person is endowed with or can
elatively easily acquired at least some entrepreneurial skills
hat make him a potential entrepreneurial microcredit borrower
ho could run a micro-enterprise. In another striking exam-
le, the European Microfinance Network (2008) estimated that
he total demand for microcredit is about 180,000–230,000
lients per year in France, which corresponds to a total stock
f 1,080,000–1,380,000 between 2000 and 2005.
In our view, these statements seem to be too optimistic and
eem to ignore the key determinant of the survival of microcre-
it: the entrepreneurial skills of the micro-borrowers which are
nstrumental to the success or failure of the micro-businesses.
or example, in its April 2008 brief CGAP discussed issues
elated to overestimation of the demand for micro-loans. Anand
nd Rosenberg (2008) point out that current estimates based
f Deve
o
b
o
d
w
w
o
o
f
e
b
t
m
d
c
t
(
2
n
i
s
w
s
l
d
s
o
l
f
n
t
a
o
b
e
f
m
t
m
i
a
c
m
c
p
t
s
t
e
c
i
c
p
d
d
t
s
o
t
m
i
d
p
o
o
t
2
2
c
E
b
o
F
l
a
a
o
d
v
t
o
a
a
c
2
s
e
n
m
u
M
n
P
For the purposes of the model, we then divide each group
into two subgroups (see Fig. 1).A.G. Ayayi, N. Yusupov / Review o
n the assumption that half of the target population would be
orrowing at any given time are too high. Reinke (2004) points
ut that the current method used to estimate microfinance
emand has significant shortcomings because many people who
ant to start micro-enterprises do not want to be in debt. They
ould rather wait until they have accumulated enough of their
wn assets before they start a business.
Given this controversy, this paper proposes a methodol-
gy for the assessment of two factors: potential demand
or entrepreneurial microcredit and optimal supply of
ntrepreneurial microcredit services, both measured by the num-
er of entrepreneurial borrowers. To the best of our knowledge,
he development financial economic literature that deals with
icrocredit demand is very limited. Previous papers that deal
irectly or indirectly with microcredit demand very rare. The
losest relevant few papers related to microcredit demand are
hose that deal with the interest rate elasticity for microcredit
Dehejia et al., 2012; Karlan and Zinman, 2008; Salazar et al.,
011). Our paper intends to contribute to this segment of microfi-
ance literature because such an estimate may have a substantial
mpact on the development of more efficient policy and on the
uccess or failure of microcredit in the coming years.
First, people become entrepreneurs because on their talents,
hich are an endowment, and, to some extent, because of their
ocio-political and economic environment. In this respect, fol-
owing the argument of Bianchi (2007) that job satisfaction in the
eveloped world is higher than in the developing world; it is rea-
onable to assume that within the developed world the number
f people that start micro-enterprises for poverty relief should be
ower than that seen in the underdeveloped world, because of the
avorable socio-economic situation and the stronger social safety
et of the poor in the developed world. Another reason may be
hat individuals that had started their micro or small businesses
fter failing to find a job would likely prefer to take advantage
f new employment opportunities instead of continuing to run
usinesses, especially if running a business is not something they
njoy doing. Therefore, the assessment of the potential demand
or entrepreneurial microcredit in a given poor neighborhood
ust be carefully crafted to avoid overestimations that may lead
o overly optimistic expectations of the future of entrepreneurial
icrocredit.
The second important point is as follows: if economic growth
s to be projected based on entrepreneurial microcredit, the
ssessment of the potential number of entrepreneurial micro-
redit borrowers must incorporate the financial sustainability of
icrocredit programs in the long run. This implies that micro-
redit programs must be able to differentiate the entrepreneurial
eople that are likely to be able to run viable micro-businesses
hat generate sufficient income to cover at least routine con-
umption levels of the entrepreneurs’ households from those
hat cannot. Therefore, we hypothesize that the demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit can be assessed without a signifi-
ant bias if it is based on the actual distribution of entrepreneurs
n the target community.
We show that the total demand for entrepreneurial micro-
redit is a positive linear function of the motivator agent’s
erformance. To replicate a concrete situation, we use French
d
ilopment Finance 2 (2012) 84–92 85
ata to provide an illustration of the assessment of potential
emand for microcredit. More specifically, we estimate that
he potential annual stock of entrepreneurial microcredit clients
hould be in the range of 131,000–251,000 if the actual number
f the poor adults does not change significantly over time. Addi-
ionally, we show that the total demand satisfied by a specific
icrofinance institution (MFI) either outreach or for-profit MFI
s derived from its utility function.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
escribes the model. Section 3 provides a computational exam-
le of potential demand. Section 4 discusses the MFI’s problem
f optimal supply depending on its objective i.e. either the client
utreach goal or the profit maximizing goal. Section 5 concludes
he paper.
. The model
.1. Description of the population
Let us call the population the potential stock of people that
ould be eligible for microcredit. Following the definition of the
uropean Union, it consists of mature individuals that cannot
ack up a loan up to D25,000.1 The whole population consists
f people that are below or slightly above the poverty line.2
ollowing this, we assume that the vast majority of these people
ive in poor neighborhoods, as we observed in France, Germany
nd Spain.
The population could be categorized by the following mutu-
lly non-exclusive characteristics: age, origin, gender and level
f qualification. However, for the purposes of this paper, we
ivide the population into the following two groups moti-
ated and non-motivated people. Motivated individuals have
aken actions to increase their wealth, and their actions can be
bserved. Some of them start their own businesses, while the rest
re either employed or are looking for jobs. The non-motivated
re those that do not take any action to improve their living
onditions.
.2. Model setup
To fulfill of the task at hand, we provide in forthcoming
ections a model that allows us come up with a reasonable
ntrepreneurial microcredit’s demand express in term of the
umber of potential micro-borrowers whose aims are to launch
icro-businesses. To achieve this goal, let P be the general pop-
lation as described in Section 2.1. Additionally, let us call
the number of people motivated to take actions and N the
on-motivated people, such that:
= M + N (1)1 Elsewhere in the world, microcredit is much less prevalent than the EU
efinition.
2 For example, in France the poverty line is defined as 60%of the median
ncome. In 2005, it was D817 per month.
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Population, P
Motivated, M Non-Motivated, N
Employees, Mn
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We divide the motivated people into people who have
ntrepreneurial skills, Me, and those who do not, Mn, such that:
= Mn + Me (2)
Similarly, we divide the non-motivated people into people
ndowed with entrepreneurial skills, Ne, and those with no
ntrepreneurial skills, Nn,
= Nn + Ne (3)
This problem, if not addressed, will have a negative effect
n the potential demand because people with enough skills to
ecome entrepreneurs in this group may not be motivated to do
o if they face low opportunity costs. In our model we resolve
his issue through a motivating agent hired by the microcre-
it institution. The agent deals with individuals that have the
ntrepreneurial skills but no intentions to apply for microcredit.
owever, given, that the non-motivated people endowed with
ntrepreneurial skills have a predisposition to run businesses; we
ssume that they can be induced to start a micro-enterprise if they
re given additional motivation by the motivator. The motivator
ob is to persuade those with entrepreneurial skills in the non-
otivated group to seek microcredit to start micro-enterprises
y motivating them and conveying to them that microcredit is
superior solution to meet their financial needs and to improve
heir well being. Simply put, the motivator has to provide the
ecessary and sufficient incentives to those with entrepreneurial
kills in the non-motivated group to launch micro-enterprises.
n the next section, we provide the details of the implementation
f the motivator agent’s actions.
.3. The motivation process
To induce the entrepreneurial non-motivated group members
o start micro-enterprises, the motivator needs a practical way to
onvince them that launching micro-enterprises will allow them
o increase their well-being. Simply put, entrepreneurial micro-
redit activities must satisfy individual rationality constraints.
g
t
w
codel.
his task is assigned to the motivator. Before providing the
equence of actions and events in the game, we summarize in
ig. 2 the motivator-non-motivated clients’ interaction.
In the motivator-non-motivated game, the motivator is some-
ne with multiple characteristics that enable him to induce the
ntrepreneurial non-motivated potential microcredit clients to
aunch micro-businesses. Therefore, on top of strong motiva-
ional skills, he needs very strong persuasive powers, and a good
nderstanding of: the socio-economic and cultural environment
nd of the psychological conditions of the target community.
aving established the motivator’s characteristics, we now turn
o the sequence of actions and steps in the game.
.3.1. Steps and ordering of moves in the game
In the game, there are five steps with the following sequence
f moves. In step one, the MFI hires a motivator to motivate the
on-motivated potential clients to seek entrepreneurial micro-
redit. Because entrepreneurial skills are hidden information,
he motivator has to induce them to come forward. To achieve
his goal, in step two the motivator sends out a structured mes-
age to the non-motivated people through the following mutually
on-exclusive channels: word of mouth, social workers, com-
unity groups, personal visits to individual households, town
all meetings, door-to-door canvassing, phone calls, radio and
V advertisements, etc. In step three, upon receiving the mes-
age and after giving serious thought to it, the non-motivated
roup members with entrepreneurial spirit, who would like to
atisfy their individual-rationality constraints through microcre-
it, contact the motivator for further information. This subgroup
denoted by Ne) of the non-motivated people is formed on the
asis of self-screening, and its size depends on the quality of the
essage conveyed by the motivator.
In step four, the motivator, through one-on-one and smallroup meetings, informs the Ne group members of the contribu-
ion of entrepreneurial microcredit to the enhancement of their
ealth and social condition. The objective of these meetings is to
learly demonstrate to the Ne group’s members that microcredit
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DFig. 2. The
s an optimal way for them to increase their wealth and conse-
uently to improve their social and material standing. All these
oals could be simply shown through a satisfactory individual
ationality constraint. At the end of this step, while some may
ecide to pursue the entrepreneurial microcredit avenue, other
ndividuals may simply decide to pursue other avenues. In step
ve, those who seek entrepreneurial microcredit to reduce their
overty are put into contact with the credit agent to procure
icrocredit after fulfilling the microcredit requirements.
.4. Total demand
Total demand has two components: demand that stems from
he motivated individuals and demand that stems from the non-
otivated group. The latter is a function of the motivator’s
ffort; it is thus endogenous demand. Let us denote demand from
otivated individuals as DEX and demand from non-motivated
ndividuals as DEN.
Now, before estimating each demand, we need to determine
he distribution of the entrepreneurial skills in each group. One
ay to approach this problem is as follows: first, we estimate the
roportion of entrepreneurial people in the active population in
given economy and second, we adjust this proportion based on
he socio-economic environment of the group. The underlying
remise for this approach is that entrepreneurial skills are not
erely endowed, but are also partly determined by the socio-
conomic environment: ceteris paribus, it would be relatively
asier for a rich/motivated person to launch a business than for
poor/non-motivated person.
To estimate the proportion of entrepreneurial people in the
conomically active population, we conjecture that each enter-
rise is launched by one person. This is particularly true for
icro-enterprises and small businesses and to some extent for
edium and large enterprises,3 when we refer to the founder. It
3 Also note that although one enterprise, if large, includes numerous manage-
ial people with entrepreneurial skills, most of those managers are employed
nd do not face risk of losing their investments in the enterprise.
2
p
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wation game.
ollows that the proportion of entrepreneurial people in the gen-
ral economy is the number of enterprises divided by the size of
he active population in the economy. In practice, the available
tatistics on the size of the economically active population are
abor force and working age population. Usually, the size of the
abor force is smaller than the size of the working age popula-
ion. Let α denote the proportion of entrepreneurial people in
he economically active population such that:
= Entreprenerial People
Economically Active People
< 10% (4)
These boundary conditions for α i.e. 0 < α < 10% are sup-
orted by Karnani (2007), who contends that in developed
ountries about 10% of people choose to be entrepreneurs, and
arker (2004), who claims the same for most OECD economies.
dditionally, our own calculation of α for France (see Section
.1) is within this boundary limit.
.4.1. Exogenous demand
Now that we have computed α, we can adjust its value to
eflect the socio-economic environment and the other factors
hat may affect motivated people. These factors may be positive
r negative events that they or their families have experienced.
ther relevant factors are events in their neighborhoods, per-
onal desire, pride and determination to get out of the vicious
ircle of poverty. For all these known and unknown potential
easons, we assume that the share of entrepreneurial individu-
ls in the group of motivated people, which we denote by αM,
elongs to the interval [α, 10%] such that:
EX = Me = αmM (5)
.4.2. Endogenous demand
To determine the endogenous demand, let us first denote the
roportion of people in the non-motivated group who approach
he motivator as β, as described in Step 3 (see Section 2.3.1) fol-
owing the structured message conveyed by the motivator. Note
hat β is the share of N who perceive themselves as endowed
ith entrepreneurial skills that decide to contact the motivating
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Having computed the numbers of motivated and non-
motivated people, we then compute the total poor adult
5 The data on people of working age in France are extrapolated from those
of the US Department of Labor because we could not procure this data directlyFig. 3. Realization of α, β
gent. From this proportion, we then assume that following their
mall group and one-on-one meetings with the motivator, in
hich they are explained the role of microcredit in the enhance-
ent of their wealth and social conditions, those who are willing
o meet the challenge will decide to embrace entrepreneurial
icrocredit. Let us call this proportion γ . Notice that, theoret-
cally, γ can take values in the interval [0, 1] since γ depends
n the quality of work performed by the agent, i.e. how good
he motivator performs his job. Thus, it follows that the share of
he entrepreneurial non-motivated people who seek microcre-
it with the help of the motivating agent, βγ , is a mirror of the
erformance of the motivator’s job.
In this respect, it becomes critical to set a non-ambiguous
arget that the motivator must fulfill in order to be able to continue
o be a determining player in the creation of the potential demand
or entrepreneurial microcredit among the non-motivated group.
n this respect, we assume that a reasonable target will be to have
≤βγ ≤β.
As for the upper boundary, β, following Chavee et al. (2007)
e hypothesize that every other poor individual is endowed
ith entrepreneurial skills. Therefore, we consider the following
imits for β4 ∈ [α, 1/2].
Note that α and γ are obtained by observing people’s actions
nd therefore are ex post, while β is observed based on the
elf-perception of entrepreneurial skills among the people that
onstitute the non-motivated group. Therefore, β is obtained
rior to the meeting with the motivator, whose job also serves
s a screening process, as illustrated by the time line in Fig. 3.
Having computed βγ , we provide the expression of the
ndogenous demand as follows:
EN = βγN (6)
Having obtained the exogenous and endogenous demand, the
otal expected demand (D) is:
= DEX + DEN = αMM + βγN (7)
Fig. 4 provides a general graphical representation of the total
otential demand for microcredit for different values of γ in
ne specific year. For example: for γ = 0.6 in 2003, the total
uantity of the potential demand for entrepreneurial microcredit
s 195,700.
More generally, in Table 3 (see next section), for each specific
alue of γ , we provide a numerical illustration of total quantity
f the potential demand for entrepreneurial microcredit from
000 to 2005.
4 Note that the upper boundary ofβ signifies an unlikely extreme case scenario.
f
h
t
e
a
hFig. 4. Total demand as a function of endogenous αN.
. Illustration of the assessment of potential demand
.1. Data collection and analysis
To illustrate the potential demand for entrepreneurial micro-
redit, we collect data from the French statistics bureau INSEE
nd the US Department of Labor (USDL) (Bureau of Labor
tatistics, 2007). From INSEE, we collect two sets of data. First,
he stock of enterprises from 2000 to 2005 and second, data on
he distribution of poor adults in order to be able to compute
he total number of poor adults to be used in the estimation of
ntrepreneurial microcredit from 2000 to 2005. From the USDL5
e gathered the data on the working-age population over the
eriod from 2000 to 2005. The Data from INSEE and USDL are
n Table 1 below.
From the data in Table 1, we compute the number of peo-
le with entrepreneurial skills as defined in Eq. (4). In addition,
e compute the total number of the motivated6 poor by adding
he employed poor to those who are seeking employment. The
umber of non-motivated poor was obtained by subtracting the
umber of poor students ages 18+ (eighteen plus) from the inac-
ive poor ages eighteen plus. We exclude students because they
re not a class of microcredit clients until they complete theirrom the INSEE database. The data we collect from US Department of Labor
ave been provided by INSEE to USDL.
6 By motivated poor we mean individuals that are actively doing some-
hing to alleviate their poverty. This population includes people endowed with
ntrepreneurial skills, who are of particular interest to this study. Please note
lso that our objective is to discern within the motivated poor individuals that
ave entrepreneurial skills.
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Table 1
The data in thousands.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
No. of enterprises 2374 2418 2469 2498 2569 2618
Working-age population 46,129 46,522 46,909 47,281 47,621 47,959
Employed poor 1750 1716 1651 1554 1594 1694
Unemployed poor 743 706 789 871 851 922
Inactive poor ages 18+ 2650 2568 2491 2445 2421 2979
Poor students ages 18+ 344 299 294 315 322 333
Total poor population 7328 7167 6976 7016 6867 7136
Table 2
Computations.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
α = No. of enterprises/working-age population 5.15% 5.20% 5.26% 5.28% 5.39% 5.46%
Motivated people = employed poor + unemployed poor 2493 2421 2440 2425 2445 2626
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ton-motivated people = inactive poor − poor students 2306
otal adult poor = motivated people + non-motivated people 4799
opulation that is pertinent for the assessment. The results of all
hese computations are shown in Table 2 below. From the data
n Table 2, we derive Fig. 5 to analyze the changes in the moti-
ated and non-motivated people over six years. This provides an
nitial insight into the progression of the potential demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit over time.
Over the given period, the number of inactive poor popula-
ion has decreased at a relatively stable rate – from 2,306,000 to
,100,000, from 2000 to 2004 – before increasing to 2,646,000
n 2005. The decrease from 2000 to 2004 is probably due to
ndividuals’ either having found jobs or becoming officially
nemployed through the public services. Ceteris paribus, we
xpect the decrease in the number of inactive poor to be trans-
ated into an increase in the active poor. Nonetheless, the
raphical representation (see Fig. 5) of the active poor does
ot reveal a constant increase over the period, but rather points
o relative stability. This suggests that from 2000 to 2005, the
ctive poor are rising above the poverty line as a result of gov-
rnment poverty reduction policies and/or generally improving
conomic conditions. This observation is consistent with the
ecreasing levels of the total poor population from 2000 to 2004
e
f
p
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
200220012000
Active Inactive (Excluding S
Fig. 5. Dynamics of active and2269 2197 2130 2100 2646
4690 4637 4555 4545 5271
s shown in Fig. 5, which, ceteris paribus, implies a reduction
n the potential demand for entrepreneurial microcredit services
ver time.
To provide a concrete estimate of the total potential demand
or entrepreneurial microcredit as expressed in Eq. (7) for dif-
erent values of γ i.e. the performance of the motivated agent,
e assume that the percentage of inactive poor who perceive
hemselves as having entrepreneurial skills is not different from
he proportion of entrepreneurial people in the general economy,
.e. β = α.
In Table 3 (see below), γ = 0 corresponds to the exogenous
emand. This scenario is equivalent to the situation where the
otivator does not induce any potential microcredit demand
rom the non-motivated poor who have entrepreneurial skills.
ver the six years, the exogenous potential demand for micro-
redit remains relatively stable, at around 128,000, aside from
005, where it is about 143,000. In contrast, γ = 1 corresponds
o the upper bound value of the total potential demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit, assuming that the motivator has per-
ormed a perfect job. In this unlikely scenario, the average total
otential demand from 2000 to 2005 would be 251,400, with the
200520042003
tudents) Total Poor
inactive poor population.
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Table 3
Total demand for various levels of γ for β = α in thousands.
γ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
0 128.3 125.8 128.4 128.1 131.9 143.3 131.0
0.1 140.1 137.6 140.0 139.4 143.2 157.8 143.0
0.2 152.0 149.4 151.5 150.6 154.5 172.2 155.1
0.3 163.9 161.2 163.1 161.9 165.9 186.7 167.1
0.4 175.8 173.0 174.7 173.2 177.2 201.1 179.2
0.5 187.6 184.8 186.2 184.4 188.5 215.6 191.2
0.6 199.5 196.6 197.8 195.7 199.8 230.1 203.2
0.7 211.4 208.4 209.3 206.9 211.2 244.5 215.3
0.8 223.2 220.2 220.9 218.2 222.5 259.0 227.3
0.9 235.1 232.0 232.5 229.4 233.8 273.4 239.4
1 247.0 243.8 244.0 240.7 245.1 287.9 251.4
m
2
m
e
a
I
t
e
y
e
F
γ
t
a
I
i
i
s
1
t
r
t
d
4
e
e
t
M
i
m
s
M
a
s
I
e
p
t
t
F
i
b
t
g
i
i
i
m
a
t
t
s
S
w
M
f
O
m
cinimum of 240,700 in 2003 and the maximum of 287,900 in
005.
Beyond these two extreme cases, it follows that the key ele-
ent to substantially increase the total potential demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit is the performance of the motivator
gent, as we pointed out in the motivation game in Section 2.3.
t is worth noting that for each value of γ , the total number of
he potential demand is relatively constant across the years. For
xample, for γ = 0.4 the total average potential demand for each
ear from 2000 to 2005 is about 179,200, while for γ = 0.7 for
ach of the six years the total potential demand is about 215,300.
urthermore, for each specific year, for any value of γ = 0.1 to
= 0.9 the total demand is between 137,600 and 273,400.
An important observation from Table 3 is that the total poten-
ial demand has remained relatively stable across the years and
cross different values of the motivator agent’s performance.
f the past is a good predictor of the future, following trends
n the motivated, non-motivated and total poor population, as
llustrated in Fig. 6, we should reasonably expect the potential
tock of the entrepreneurial microcredit clients to be within the
31,000–251,000 range.
Because the total potential demand is a linear positive func-
ion of γ (see Eq. (7) or Table 3), an important question that
emains to be answered is: what is the total potential demand
hat the MFI wants to satisfy? The answer to this question, which
epends on the type of the MFI, is the subject of the next section.   MFI’s Utility Function 
P Number of Borrowers
Fig. 6. Monotonically increasing utility function.
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. Optimizing the supply
In our model, the extent to which potential demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit is satisfied depends on the prefer-
nces of the MFI that offers the microcredit contracts. Thus, in
his section we look at the supply optimization problem of the
FI to determine what part of the potential demand the MFI
s going to satisfy depending on its objective. The MFI in our
odel is an expected utility maximizer that can be of two types:
ocially oriented and commercially driven. Given that a social
FI wants to supply its services to as many micro-entrepreneurs
s possible, its objective is to maximize outreach, which is mea-
ured by the number of individuals gaining access to microcredit.
n contrast, the commercial MFI’s objective is to maximize its
xpected profit.
Now, following a standard assumption in economics that
rofit is a concave function of the inputs, we conjecture that
he expected utility of the MFI is concave but the concavity of
he MFI’s expected profit will depend on the MFI’s objective.
ollowing this objective, we distinguish between monotonically
ncreasing and non-monotonic concave forms that are applica-
le to the two types of MFIs: those which target outreach and
hose which prioritize financial performance. Both cases can be
eneralized through a quadratic utility function of S, where S
s the number of contracts offered by the MFI, defined over the
nterval [0, P], where P is the size of the population as defined
n Section 2.1.
For an outreach maximizing MFI, the solution of the utility
aximization problem implies using all of its budget to extend
s many loans as possible, while for a profit maximizing MFI
he solution of the utility maximization problem with respect to
he number of clients, assuming no adverse selection, will be S*,
uch that:
∗ = argmax
S
U(S) (8)
here U (S) is the utility function. If the value S* is smaller than
e then the MFI will not hire the agent because the demand
rom the motivated people already exceeds the optimal demand.
therwise the MFI will seek additional clients by employing the
otivation expert in the field. A detailed discussion of these two
ases follows.
.1. Outreach maximizing MFIs
If the MFI prioritizes the social mission, i.e. aims at max-
mizing outreach, it is likely to have its objective function
onotonically increasing in U simply because more clients is
etter. This function has a positive slope everywhere on the
wo-dimensional (utility function, number of clients) space.
The easiest utility function to deal with is a straight line with
positive slope, in which case marginal utility stays constant.
owever, it is more realistic to assume that the marginal utility
ecreases as the number of borrowers increases, as illustrated
n Fig. 6. For instance, getting the first client to sign a contract
s more desirable than getting the thousandth client to do so
ecause the target community is expected to get less poor as
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The regularity conditions for γ and μ.
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fFig. 7. Increase in competition drives down the profit margins.
ore borrowers contract a loan. One example of such a utility
unction could be the following quadratic function:
(S) = νS − S2 (9)
Marginal utility is computed as:
∂U(S)
∂S
= ν − 2S (10)
Theoretically, S changes from 0 to P but is bounded above
y 1/2P because we suppose that opening a business is more
ifficult than finding a job, thus the number of entrepreneurs
annot be the majority of population. Therefore the marginal
tility (Eq. (10)) decreases as S increases but remains always
ositive for 0 < ν < 2P
.2. Proﬁt maximizing MFIs
Because micro-entrepreneurs engage in low-tech and
elatively homogenous activities, a higher number of micro-
ntrepreneurs entering the market increases competition and
educes profit margins. Fig. 8 illustrates a typical case of a micro-
ntrepreneur who sells q units of his product at the price p. As
he number of entrepreneurs increases, the demand curve, p(q)
hifts down on the (price, quantity) plane to p*(q) as a direct
onsequence of the increase in competition until it reaches the
oint of tangency to the average cost curve.
Consequently, each MFI’s client profit decreases, which
ffectively increases the expectation of the number of bad loans.
his, in turn, drives down the expected profit from offering
icrocredit services for the for-profit MFI. Therefore, there
xists an optimal value S*, as defined in Eq. (8), that maximizes
he MFI’s expected profit. If S∗ ≤ DEX then the MFI supplies
   MFI’s Utility Function 
μ2
1*
=S P Number of Borrowers
Fig. 8. Strictly concave utility function.
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*
, otherwise it supplies DEX and hires the motivating agent to
enerate more demand7 (Fig. 7)
Thus, the optimal supply can be written as min{S∗,DEX}
lus additional demand created by the motivating agent (which
s zero if unnecessary). However, if S* > DEX, then the MFI can
ncrease its utility by increasing the number of its clients to the
ptimal level S* and will ask the motivator to bring in (S* −DEX)
dditional clients. Thus, if the MFI seeks to maximize expected
rofit, its utility function is likely to be concave in the number
f borrowers, such as:
(S) = μS − (μS)2 (11)
For this utility function the maximum is reached at
*
= 1/(2μ). In order to have S* positive but less than P, i.e.
o guarantee an internal solution, μ must belong to the interval
0, 1/(2P)].
From Sections 4.1 and 4.2, it follows that the utility func-
ion of any kind of MFI (outreach and profit maximizer) can be
epresented in the following form:
(S) = μνS − (μS)2 (12)
here the parameters γ and μ should satisfy the regularity con-
itions given in Table 4.
The number of additional clients the MFI will ask the moti-
ator agent to bring in can be written as max{0, S∗ − DEX}.
ence, the optimal supply formula becomes
= min{S∗,DEX} + max{0, S∗ − DEX} (13)
. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a methodology for the assessment
f the potential demand for microcredit as well as a method
or the assessment of the optimal supply. With French data on
oor adults we find that the stock of poor individuals who are
ikely to have potential demand for microcredit must be within
he range of 131,000–251,000. To derive this result, we assume
hat the total potential demand for entrepreneurial microcredit
s divided into exogenous demand and the demand generated
y the motivator among the non-motivated poor. The results
f our methodology refute the optimistic projections of ADIE,
he main French microcredit institution, which is in line with
&P’s overly optimistic projection we quoted in the introduction
o the paper. We also show that the total potential demand for
ntrepreneurial microcredit is a positive linear function of the
otivator’s performance. Furthermore, we show that optimal
7 We assume a zero cost of hiring the agent.
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